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Abstract
In the division of fiscal responsibilities between central and local governments, it
is usually argued that income insurance and inequality should be dealt with by the
central government. This paper explores the extent to which the US federal tax and
transfer system is able to provide uniform social insurance to a prototype family in
different states, given variations in state tax and transfer policies. We simulate the
combined response of federal and state taxes and transfers to a negative pre-tax income
shock, and compare the results for different states. We find large differences in the level
of insurance experienced by households in different states, particularly for low income
households, and that these differences are mostly driven by state policies.
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1 Introduction
It has long been regarded as a basic principle of fiscal federalism that public insurance and
income redistribution are best implemented by higher levels of government (Oates (1999);
Boadway and Tremblay (2012)). The arguments in favour of this position mostly concern
limitations in the ability of lower levels of government to raise revenue, due to differences
in tax bases and the budgetary impact of tax base mobility. In contrast, lower levels of
government may have better information on local conditions and the preferences of local
residents. More recently, this kind of reasoning has partly motivated calls for the European
Union to develop a union-level fiscal capacity. In this paper, we re-examine the division
of fiscal responsibilities in the context of the US federal system, using a simulation of the
federal and state tax and transfer systems.
COULD ADD HERE: Why central government should redistribute: support for the poor
is a national good (Ladd and Doolittle, 1982) ; adverse sorting of individuals (Brown and
Oates 1987). One view: Some sharing of the distribution function. King (1984) ”A basic
national redistribution policy, and that subcentral authorities should be allowed to alter
the degree of distribution in their areas within specified limits”
The United States is often put forward as a benchmark of fiscal federalism that combines
a strong federal authority with highly independent state governments. However, we note
several important departures from the theoretical ideal of a fiscal federation which may
restrict the ability of a central government to achieve its objectives. Instead of the pure
division of policy responsibilities, we see that in some cases state governments engage in
extensive redistribution (as noted in Gordon and Cullen (2012)). In addition, it may also
be a realistic constraint on some key central government functions that they cannot vary
to accommodate differences in local conditions so that, for example, the federal (nominal)
income tax schedule cannot vary across states despite different living costs.1 The United
States federal government may therefore face considerable limitations as it attempts to re-
allocate income between different types of household.
If the federal government is concerned with the welfare of households regardless of their
location, we should expect to see equal treatment of equivalent households in different loca-
tions under the tax and transfer system, once local policies are taken into account. Stated
differently, state policies may differ due to differences in resources and fiscal constraints,
but optimal federal policies should be designed to counteract these differences (Gordon and
Cullen (2012))2. Furthermore, if agents’ preferences exhibit constant relative risk aversion
(or elasticity of substitution) we should expect that agents at different income levels have
similar exposure to proportional income changes.
This paper presents evidence that this intuition fails for the United States federal system,
finding instead that there is considerable variation between households living in different
states in the response of disposable income to pre-tax earnings shocks, and within states for
different income levels. We find this by simulating the response of the combined tax and
1Moretti (2013) provides evidence that differences in the cost of living can be important for evaluating
the welfare implications of nominal wage differences.
2It is possible that state programs will differ due to preferences for redistribution or risk tolerance. We
choose not to explore this avenue in detail but note the lack of clear evidence in support of this argument
(see, for example, Alesina and Ferrara (2005))
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transfer system to a negative household earnings shock in different states. The variation
partly reflects unintended redistributions resulting from local living cost differences, as a
result of which households in expensive states lose out. We develop an intuitive measure of
the responsiveness of disposable income to pre-tax income shocks and compute this measure
for different states and income levels.
Our results are surprising for several reasons. There are large differences in the per-capita
income levels of states, which impact state tax revenues and demand for welfare programs;
targeted federal grants, however, are designed to mitigate these differences. We might ex-
pect that the redistribution motive within states and federal assistance would push towards
more uniform support for the poor. Federal grants to states for Medicaid, for instance, are
significantly more generous for poor states than they are for rich states3; other things equal,
we would expect a more munificent provision of income support in states where more poor
households are located. Nevertheless, we find that an earnings shock to a poor household
triggers a much weaker transfer response if the household is located in Mississippi, a poor
state, than if it is located in Massachusetts, a rich state.
ADD HERE: Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Jeffrey Sachs (1991) find that ”We find that a one
dollar reduction in a region’s per capita personal income triggers a decrease in federal taxes
of about 34 cents and an increase in federal transfers of about 6 cents. Hence, the final
reduction in disposable per capita income is on the order of 60 cents. That is, between one
third and one half of the initial shock is absorbed by the federal government. The much
larger reaction of taxes than transfers to these regional imbalances reflects the fact that
the main mechanism at work is the federal income tax system which in turn means that
the stabilization process is automatic rather than specifically designed each time there is a
cyclical movement in income.”
Our paper complements the existing empirical literature on risk sharing and redistribution
between US states which considers changes income at the state level. Von Hagen (1992)
finds that the US federal fiscal system provides little insurance against shocks to state in-
come. Asdrubali et al. (1996) decompose the sources of risk sharing between states into
private and public insurance; while they find that the federal government does play a role
in smoothing gross state product, much more insurance is provided by capital and credit
markets. More recently, Rodden and Wibbels (2010) include the United States in a panel
of seven federations for which they find that central government grants contribute to rather
than alleviating the procyclicality of subnational government funds. We differ from this
literature by formulating the objective of the federal government in terms of household
welfare as opposed to state budgets, and therefore conducting the empirical analysis at the
household level. This allows us to separate the effects of state policy from income flows
from the federal government which result from differences in state income distributions.
The closest paper to ours is Hoynes and Luttmer (2011), which evaluates the welfare impact
of state tax and transfer programs. In their paper, the value of the system is decomposed
into a redistributive value, derived from the response to predictable income changes, and
the insurance value, which responds to unexpected shocks. We answer a different question
3The amount of Medicaid grants to states is determined by the federal medical assistance percentage
(FMAP), which stipulates the percentage of a dollar of state spending on Medicaid which will be matched
by the federal government. FMAP rates are a function of state per capita income relative to the US average,
and vary from a legislated floor of 50% to a maximum of 83%
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in that we consider the possibility that state policies may be partly be designed to address
limitations in federal policies. We therefore simulate the combined federal-state system.
Our simulation methodology also represents a novel approach to overcoming the limited
state level data combining household observations on income, consumption and net trans-
fers.
ADD HERE: Methodologically, our work is related to Beraja, Hurst and Ospina (2016).
As in their paper, we take price differences across US states seriously and construct an
innovative measure to capture respective differentials. Unlike their measure, ours is tailored
to the characteristics of the household we study. Moreover, it goes back much further in
time. Finally, it captures a much larger share of common household expenditures.
ADD HERE: We also check if there is a relationship between party affiliation of state gov-
ernment and Congress majority or White House. ”strategic partisan transfers hypothesis”.
See Bugarin and Marciniuk 2017 for evidence from Brazil. US?
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we clarify the available channels of
social insurance by outlining the main features of the US federal fiscal system, in particular
highlighting evidence on the variation in state level resources and welfare policies. In section
3 we describe the simulation which we perform to capture the responses of federal and state
net transfer systems to changes in pre-tax income. In section 4 we present the results of
this exercise. Section 5 contains concluding comments.
2 The United States Federal System
In the United States fiscal system, both federal and state governments raise revenue through
taxes on income, consumption and property, although the composition of taxes varies widely.
Welfare programs to targeted groups of households are provided through several funding
systems:
• Direct transfers from the federal government to households financed from federal rev-
enues
• Direct transfers from state governments to households financed from state revenues
• Transfer programs implemented and administered at the state level, using grants
provided by the federal government
There are also programs which use a mixture of funding sources, such as Medicaid, which
is co-financed by state and federal revenues. We summarize the basic flows in Figure 1.
Both the needs and the resources of the states differ because of variations in state income
distributions. Figure 2 indicates the extent to which the need for income support may vary
between states, showing the proportion of households in poverty as defined by the federal
poverty line in 1960 and 20104; the overall incidence of poverty decreased considerably over
this period, but it is still roughly twice as high in Mississippi than in a richer state like
Maryland or New Hampshire. Sommeiller and Price (2014) document the variation in the
prevalence of very rich taxpayers in different states; for example, the average income of the
4The federal poverty line is a benchmark household income level used by the US government to determine
eligibility for federal aid. It does not vary between states.
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• Gfi are the federal flows to the state governments. We obtain them from the consolidated
flow accounts. They comprise ... and can be broken down into... .
• g fi are the compensation of federal employees flows. They include wages, ...
• tsi are the taxes paid to state governments by the citizens of their state. We obtain infor-
mation on their heterogeneity across states (progressivity, etc.) from ... and use TaxSim to
impute them for our observations from the PSID.
• t fi are the federal taxes collected from the citizens of the different states. We use TaxSim
to impute them for the PSID.
• isi are transfers provided by the states to their citizens. We obtain info on them from ... and
use the AFCD/TANF as well as medicaid calculators provided by Hoynes and Luttmer
to impute them for the observations in the PSID. (Need to check if their are contained in
there...)
• i fi are the federal transfers provided to citizens in the states. They comprise Social Secu-
rity, SSI, ... . We obtain them from the PSID (is this correct?).
2 Unemployment Insurance in the US
Unemployment insurance (UI) is a federal-state based program. The federal law of 1935 man-
dates that all state governments provide some UI but gives them discretion to design details
1
Figure 1: US fiscal funding flows. τ refers to taxes, g to transfers, and G to intergovern-
mental grants
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Figure 2: Percentage of families in poverty by state
6
top 1% in Connecticut was $2.2 million in Connecticut in 2011, compared with $635K in
Hawaii. Moreover, the states with relatively large populations of poor households tend to
be those with fewer rich payers. These distributional variations may limit the amount of
redistribution which some of the states could achieve by themselves, suggesting a role for
the federal government to reallocate resources between states.5.
In order to capture the variation in state income tax systems, we use information from
TaxSim to estimate the following tax function for each state:
T (y) = y − λy(1−τ) (1)
where T (.) denotes net taxes, λ controls the average level of taxes and τ controls the pro-
gressivity. This functional form is shown in Heathcote et al. (2017) to provide a good fit
for net taxes at the national level. The estimates of the progressivity parameter τ for the
year 2000 are shown in Figure 3. As well as state income taxes, the results also reflect the
impact of deductions and state earned income tax credit systems. In general, state income
tax schedules are less progressive than the federal tax, but there is large variation across
states, from no income taxation, to uniform taxation to more progressive systems (a value
of 0 indicates either no income tax or a uniform tax rate).
We also see considerable differences across states in the provision of welfare programs. The
most interesting cases are those of programs which receive federal funding but where states
are given autonomy in the implementation of the programs, determining which services are
provided, the eligibility requirements and the generosity of provision to recipients. Figure
4 shows the percentage of the population of each state receiving Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF) funds, which provide cash assistance and work incentives to low
income families, and the maximum monthly benefit. Figure 5 shows the recipient percent-
age and average monthly benefit for Medicaid6. In the case of Medicaid, even states which
have similar proportions of recipients, such as Kentucky and Alaska, have widely differing
benefit levels. It is also striking, however, that the availability of benefits does not seem
to mirror the indicators of need - California, for example, has one of the most expansive
implementations of TANF despite having one of the lowest proportions of poor households.
The total distributional effect of state and federal net transfers for the year 2000 is shown
in Figure 6, which shows each state’s income Gini coefficient before taxes, after Federal
net transfers and after total net transfers; all incomes are adjusted for differences in local
price levels. In every state, federal taxes and transfers achieved a substantial amount of
redistribution, as measured by the decrease in inequality after the application of federal
policies. However, states vary in how much more ‘compression’ they achieve in addition to
this. For example, in South Dakota, there was virtually no further decrease in inequality
once state policies are included, whereas New York carried out much more redistribution
beyond that provided by the federal government. Moreover, there is no obvious pattern in
the outcomes. Federal policies do not disproportionally affect richer or more unequal states;
5In addition, states have self-imposed balanced budget rules which provide legislative restrictions on the
accumulation of debt.
6We should note here that the Medicaid benefits are in kind in the form of medical services rather than
direct cash benefits. We provide equivalent cash values here.
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Figure 3: State tax progressivity parameters τ for HSV tax function T (y) = y − λy(1−τ)
more equal states do not systematically carry out less redistribution than more unequal ones.
These observations raise the question of the extent to which autonomy at the state level is
a constraint on our proposed federal objective of uniform insurance provision. As shown in
Figure 1, the federal tax schedule does not discriminate between states. Funding designs
such as matching grants can, however, change the effective price of spending on welfare pro-
grams (Ribar and Wilhelm, 1999). Nevertheless, the different implementations of transfer
programs and local living cost differences point to the possibility that the combined (state
and federal) tax and transfer system provides heterogeneous income insurance across states
for households with comparable incomes. We aim to investigate this further through our
analysis.
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Figure 4: TANF Recipient density and benefit generosity by state in 2009
Figure 5: Medicaid Recipient density and benefit generosity by state in 2009
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Figure 6: Gini coefficients by state, in the year 2000, for before tax income, disposable income
after federal taxes and transfers and disposable income after all taxes and transfers. Calculated for
the ‘prototype’ household in our main exercise
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3 Our Experiment
We compute the response of taxes and transfers to a given change in household income by
designing a model which captures the relevant features of US federal and state policies. In
other words, we do not work with observed household data beyond incomes and rent pay-
ments conditional on household characteristics including residence and year. Instead, we
construct a model which accounts for the differences in state tax and transfer programs and
allows us to impute the changes instead of observing them. In effect, our model replicates
the shape of the effective (marginal) tax schedule (taxes and transfers combined) as it is
presented in, for example, Holt and Romich (2007) or Congressional Budget Office (2012)
for different years and states along the distribution of household incomes.
In our empirical exercise we simulate the response of household disposable income to a
negative shock to pre-tax income by accounting for changes in taxes and transfers. We
construct a simplified version of the US tax and transfer system using a combination of
previously available benefit calculators and our own calculators. In order to achieve this,
we consider the main income support programs: Temporary Assistance for Needy Fami-
lies (TANF, formerly Aid to Families with Dependent Children), Medicaid, Earned Income
Tax Credits (both state and federal),7 and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP, formerly Food Stamps). These programs account for large proportion of welfare
spending in the United States. Their relative contributions are summarized in Appendix
A.1.
Obvious omissions from this analysis are the unemployment insurance and Social Security
systems. We choose not to include these because their eligibility and benefit levels depend
on the individual’s history of labour market participation and Social Security contributions.
We therefore do not see these as providing unconditional protection against a reduction in
income; instead they function more as a (subsidized) form of self-insurance which is man-
aged by the federal government.
ADD HERE: Work by Beraja, Fuster, Hurst and Vavra (2015) found that, e.g. during the
Great Recession, unemployment benefits were a quantitatively small source of insurance.
They report that even those MSAs in which residents hat the lowest values of home equity,
received a total of ”16.3 billion in unemployment benefits payments in 2009 and 9.6 billion
in 2008”. (footnote 16, page 13). This is small compared to the Medicaid, TANF, EITC -
NEED TO COMPLETE THIS.
3.1 The Prototype Family
In order to capture correctly the changes in tax liabilities and transfer entitlements, we
consider a household with fixed characteristics across years and states. Assigning spe-
cific household characteristics and keeping them fixed is necessary to conduct our analysis
correctly and addresses an important precondition for giving a meaningful answer to our
research question. It is necessary as the sources of insurance we study depend not only
on income but also on other household characteristics. For taxes, a critical determinant of
liabilities and credits is the number of dependants of a tax filer and whether a couple is able
7In addition to the federal level EITC some states and even local governments provide their own tax
credit systems.
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to file jointly. In addition, the presence of children in the household grants specific child tax
credits and deductions for childcare expenses. Mortgage expenditures and pension incomes
are also deductible items.
Household characteristics are equally important to determine eligibility and generosity of
the transfer programs we consider. For SNAP and AFDC/TANF the number of family
members is a critical parameter. For Medicaid, a key element of the heterogeneity in
eligibility across states is the extent to which children are covered. Hence, it is necessary to
specify (and fix) children ages. For these reasons, our prototype family remains invariant
throughout our microsimulation exercise with respect to relevant characteristics, listed as
follows:
• A married couple with two children between ages 12 and 17
• Family income from two equal full time labour incomes
• No disabilities
• The family home is rented (no mortgage payments)
• No other family members occupy the home
• The family does not migrate as a response to changes in earnings
The advantage of our approach is that it allows us to capture differences in insurance
provided by combined federal and state net transfers using a consistent benchmark. If we
were to change family characteristics our results would be less informative for our research
question. On the one hand, they would confound the differences we are interested in with
potential differences in state government preferences over specific family types. On the
other hand, if we were to vary the family composition between states and years to reflect
state averages, we would not be able to separate the effects of federal from state policies
consistently. This is because, as described above, family composition and size are key
determinants of eligibility and benefit levels for welfare programs.
3.2 Simulation
For a given year, we then locate this prototype household in a particular state at the 10th
and 90th percentiles of the state pre-tax income distribution8 to capture the experience of a
poor and a rich household respectively. Given the level of pre-tax income, we apply a neg-
ative real income shock of 10%. To convert the nominal pre-tax income to a real measure,
we use a subsistence expenditure amount. We calculate this subsistence expenditure as the
sum of two components. The first is the minimum required level of monthly food spending
(as reflected in the federal Thrifty Food Plan, a US government measure which specifies
the minimum amount which a family of a given size needs to spend to consume a basic
diet). The second is the average monthly rent payment for households in the same state
with similar characteristics and income. We consider both of these components as fixed
costs for the household, in the sense that once a shock to income is realized, the household
cannot respond by forgoing these expenditures.
8An alternative experiment would carry out the same analysis using the national income percentiles. We
choose to locate the family relative to state income distribution because we believe that this is the relevant
distribution from the perspective of a state social planner.
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We obtain the conditional average monthly rent9 for each year and state combination by
obtaining the 5 and 15 percentile and 85 and 95 percentiles of the income distribution of
families which are similar to our prototype family (we condition on marital status, family
size as well as number and ages of children). We then average gross monthly rents across
families who reported incomes within these groups for a given year and state.10. These av-
erages constitute the rent component of our consumption measure for poor and rich families
in the different states and years.11
We define the shock p,s, for a family at income percentile p and living in state s, as:
p,s = κ ∗
w0p,s
e¯p,s
(2)
where κ is a constant, w0p,s is the household’s pre-tax income and e¯p,s is the expenditure on
the subsistence basket. To produce our desired 10% real income shock, κ is set to 0.1. We
interpret p,s as a shock which is similarly ‘painful’ for households with different incomes
and locations. Thus, a household with a higher income will receive a larger shock than a
household with a lower income in the same state; a household in a more expensive state
will receive a smaller shock than a household with the same income in a cheaper state.
We also consider this shock as being unexpected by the household. Our results then mea-
sure the on impact response of tax and transfers; we therefore do not consider any other
responses by the household such as changes in labour decision or asset positions. We then
compare disposable income (i.e. income adjusted for taxes paid and transfers received) at
the pre-shock and post-shock levels. This exercise is repeated for all US states. Under our
basic assumptions about the objective of federal policy, the combined tax-transfer system
should provide uniform insurance against such shocks.
For a pre-tax income of w0p,s, the value of pre-tax income after the shock is given by
12:
w1p,s = w
0
p,s − p,s (3)
The pre-shock and post-shock disposable incomes, y0p,s and y
1
p,s are then given by:
9The ACS variable which we use for rent (”RENTGRS”) is ”gross monthly rental cost of the housing
unit, including contract rent plus additional costs for utilities (water, electricity, gas) and fuels (oil, coal,
kerosene, wood, etc.)” As noted by IPUMS, this makes the variable more comparable across households than
net rents and, as our aim is to capture all household expenditures related to housing, this variable is ideal
for our purposes.
10Official measures of representative rents are computed in a similar way; for example, the Fair Market
Rents (FMR), which are estimated by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
correspond to the 40th percentile of the distribution of monthly rents of all units occupied by rent movers
in a specified geographic area. As we are interested to estimate results for households with low and high
incomes separately, we condition their average rents on the income distribution as described above.
11In some rare cases, the resulting averages appear unrealistic: They are either much lower than in the
years before or the rent of poor households is higher than that of rich ones. The reasons for these anomalies
are low number of observations. For those cases, we widen the bands of the incomes to the 2 and 18 and
82 and 99 percentiles respectively. We replace remaining outliers by linear interpolation using the values
of leading and trailing years. As we report in the robustness section, these procedures do not affect our
findings substantially.
12Here we suppress notation referring to the characteristics of the household, which will also determine eli-
gibility for welfare programs and income tax credits. As explained above, we hold the relevant characteristics
of the household fixed throughout the exercise.
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y0p,s = w
0
p,s − τ f (w0p,s)− τ s(w0p,s) + gf (w0p,s) + gs(w0p,s) (4)
y1p,s = w
1
p,s − τ f (w1p,s)− τ s(w1p,s) + gf (w1p,s) + gs(w1p,s) (5)
where the superscripts f and s refer to federal and state government respectively, τ refers
to taxes and g refers to transfers.
Our measure of the insurance provided by the combined tax and transfer system is:
χp,s = 1− ∆p,s
p,s
(6)
where
∆p,s = y
0
p,s − y1p,s (7)
measures the change in disposable income induced by the earnings shock. Thus, if dispos-
able income declines by the entire amount of the shock p,s, the insurance measure χp,s will
be zero, indicating that the system provides no insurance against the shock; conversely if
disposable income does not decline at all, χp,s will be one, indicating full insurance. In-
termediate values indicate partial insurance13. More generally, if household pre-tax income
undergoes a negative shock of one subsistence basket, 1−χp,s is the number of baskets lost
from disposable income due to changes in state and federal taxes and transfers.
4 Results
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the average values of the insurance measure χp,s by state over the
period 2000-2008, separately for rich households and poor households. A key question for
our analysis is whether the patterns of social insurance which we see across states are in any
way explained by the income distributions within each state. In particular we can look at
the association with the average income level and the dispersion of income within each state.
Taking the insurance coefficients of the poor household first, we see that many states with
GDP per capita above the US average appear high in the rankings. For example, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania and Massachussetts have the highest average coefficients over this pe-
riod, with 0.59, 0.58 and 0.54 respectively. However, there are some striking exceptions to
this rule, such as Texas (0.11) and California (0.11). The poor performance of California is
especially surprising since as discussed previously, this state implements fairly large low in-
come support programs despite having a relatively low proportion of households in poverty.
This mostly reflects the fact that our prototype household, which has two working parents,
would not qualify for AFDC/TANF, and therefore does not benefit from California’s gen-
erosity in this program. In addition, while California administered Medicaid benefits to
a large percentage of the population in 2009 (Figure 5), the average annual benefits per
recipient are comparatively low. In contrast, the performance of Texas is easily explained
13It is possible for states to have values above 1, in which case after tax transfers increase more than the
amount of the shock, and negative values, which indicate that disposable income actually falls more than
the value of the shock.
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Figure 7: Insurance values for the rich, lighter shades indicate larger values; varies from
maximum of 0.4 (California) to minimum of 0.28 (South Dakota)
Figure 8: Insurance values for the poor; varies from maximum of 0.58 (Pennsylvania) to a
minimum of -0.17 (West Virginia)
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by its policy choices and high income level, the latter meaning that it receives grants less
intensely from the Federal government.
As a corollary, we see that many poor states appear closer to the bottom of the rank-
ings, such as Mississippi, Kentucky and West Virginia; in fact the last two of these states
have negative insurance coefficients of -0.03 and -0.17 respectively, suggesting that their net
transfer policies actually exacerbate the negative income shock suffered by the prototype
poor family. This is what we would expect if the states were completely responsible for
financing their own welfare policies, since these states have smaller tax bases. However,
the fact that they have below average income levels means that they are eligible to receive
larger grants from the Federal government; in particular, their Medicaid expenditures are
subsidized at a much higher rate. Nevertheless, as shown in Figures 4 and 5, these states
seem to implement TANF and Medicaid with strict eligibility rules and low generosity per
enrollee.
For the rich household insurance coefficient, the overall picture is very different. Firstly,
we note that there is much less variation across states, with the average coefficients rang-
ing from 0.28 in South Dakota to 0.4 in California. By construction, our prototype rich
household is not eligible for any of the welfare programs in our simulation. Consequently,
the variation in the rich household coefficients comes either from the combined effect of the
state and federal income tax schedules or differences in local living costs. In real terms,
the progressivity of the federal tax schedule is more severe for the rich family when it is
located in a more expensive state. Comparing Figure 7 with Figure 3, we see that the states
which in 2000 had no income tax or uniform income tax systems (τ = 0) provide the least
insurance for the rich family.
The differences in state income distributions also play a role in these results, and may ex-
plain why the rich insurance coefficients do not completely follow the pattern of state tax
progressivity once we move away from flat (or zero) taxes. Recall that the rich prototype
household is defined relative to the state income distribution, rather than the national in-
come distribution. As a result, rich households in states like Connecticut and New York,
which have high GDP per capita, are rich compared to both the nation and the state, and so
they face high tax progressivity in both the state and federal tax schedules. These states are
therefore very high in the rich insurance rankings with average coefficients of 0.39 and 0.38
respectively. In contrast, Vermont has a lower coefficient of 0.36 (compared to a median of
0.35) despite having a highly progressive income tax. We can explain this by the fact that
GDP per capita in Vermont is below the median for US states; a ‘rich’ household in Vermont
may therefore be less rich relative to the national income distribution. This is confirmed by
the finding in Sommeiller and Price (2014) that in 2011, the income threshold for entering
the top 1% of earners in Vermont was $256,807 while the equivalent for Connecticut was
$624,524.
We explore these patterns further by breaking down the relative contributions of the federal
and state governments, which should provide more evidence for evaluating our claim that
state government policies drive the differences in outcomes. For government level i ∈ {s, f},
we define χip,s as
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χip,s =
τ i(w0p,s)− τ i(w1p,s) + gi(w1p,s)− gi(w0p,s)
p,s
(8)
which is the ratio of the change in net transfers from government level i to the income
shock. Since by definition χp,s = χ
s
p,s + χ
f
p,s, the relative contribution of government level i
is a useful measure. We define this as:
ρip,s =
χip,s
χp,s
(9)
In Figure 9 we plot the relative federal contribution to insurance against the insurance coef-
ficients for each state. The variation along the x-axis, which measures the average insurance
coefficient for the poor family, again illustrates the geographical differences in the treatment
of low income families. However, we also see that for any given level of insurance, there
are also large differences in the composition of the changes in net transfers. For example,
New Hampshire is slightly below the median in terms of insurance, but all of this insur-
ance is provided by the Federal government; Florida, on the other hand, has a similar level
of insurance, but only 40% of the change in net transfers is accounted for by the Federal
government. Numerically, this means that if four subsistence expenditure baskets are taken
away from the pre-tax earnings of the poor household in either state, in both states dispos-
able income will fall by roughly three subsistence baskets; however, in New Hampshire the
one basket which is not lost is entirely accounted for by an increase in net federal transfers,
while in Florida, increased net state transfers account for 60% of this basket.
Overall, we see that there is a negative relationship between the total level of insurance
and the Federal contribution to insurance, so that poor households receive more support
in locations where the state government makes a higher contribution, and receive worse
support in locations where they must rely entirely on the Federal government.
5 Concluding Remarks
We present a framework for comparing the level of income insurance received by household
in different US states. Against the intuitive benchmark that the federal level of government
should aim for uniform insurance to all residents once state policies are accounted for, we
find considerable variation between states. In particular, we find that this variation is much
greater for low income households and that it is driven primarily by differences in state
fiscal policies. We take this as supporting the claim that differences in state welfare and
tax policies determine the level of insurance which a poor household receives in each location.
We interpret these results as a demonstrating a limitation on the ability of central fiscal
policy to provide uniform income insurance in a federal system. This partly reflects dif-
ferences in the implementation of state-federal co-financed activities. Such differences are
well documented (e.g. Clemens and Ippolito (2017); Floyd et al.). The results also reflect
differences between states in design of their own welfare programs and tax schedules. Taken
together, these variations in local government policies can act as a real constraint on the
equalization efforts of the central government. Going forward, we would like to see whether
there is any correspondence between the degree of income insurance in each state and the
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Figure 9: Insurance coefficients for low income households (x-axis) against federal insurance
contribution (y-axis)
extent to which each state’s welfare programs are funded by grants from the federal gov-
ernment.
We would also like to see whether there is a way of accounting for the patterns of insurance
provision through differences in the income processes of different states. As documented in
Caliendo et al. (2014), the sectoral compositions of the regional economies in the USA are
very heterogeneous. It is possible that the resulting exposures to different economic sectors
mean that a ‘typical’ pre-tax income shock is very different from one state to another. The
state policies may then be responses to differing levels of income risk.
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A Appendix
A.1 Welfare Programs
MAKE TRANSFER TABLE
JF
Selected US governmental policies insuring income risk Expenditures (2007 USD) Imputation
FEDERAL total (bn) recipient/month
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, ’Food Stamps’) 30 96 calculator (own brew)
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 49 165 federal tax (TaxSim)
STATE
Medicaid 329 482 calculator (H. Hoynes)
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF, formerly AFDC) 12 234 calculator (H. Hoynes)
State Earned Income Tax Credit (SEITC) NA NA state tax (TaxSim)
Unemployment insurance (UI) 32 354 (not considered)
1
Figure 10: Transfer programs included in simulation
Imputations
A.2 AFDC/TANF and Medicaid
Hoynes and Luttmer (2011) determined eligibility and benefits of the transfer programs
”Temporary Assistance for Needy Families” (TANF; ”Aid to Families with Dependent
Children”, AFDC, until 1996) and Medicaid. We use the same calculators and we cor-
dially thank Hilary Hoynes for sharing them with us. The appendix of her paper provides
details on the calculators so we just briefly describe their main features.
AFDC/TANF The benefit formula is given as
benefit = maximum benefit - benefit reduction rate × (earnings - earnings disregard) - un-
earned income
The state specific regulations regarding eligibility and generosity of this program materialize
through differences in the earnings disregard, the benefit reduction rate and the maximum
benefit. State policy makers enjoyed much less freedom to adjust program parameters prior
to the introduction of the AFDC waivers and TANF. For years corresponding to this period
the AFDC calculator uses ”the most generous tax and disregards for all calculations” while,
for years after 1996, the TANF calculator ”does not take into account lifetime time limits
or work requirements”. Finally, the calculators assume a uniform take-up rate of 100%.
Regarding the quality of the imputations produced by the calculators, Hoynes and Luttmer
(2011) state that their calculations compare favorably with administrative data and other
studies (see the appendix of their paper for details).
Medicaid Prior to 1987, eligibility for AFDC leads to mandatory eligibility for Medicaid.
To capture the state determined Medicaid expansions in later years, Hoynes and Luttmer
(2011) by include state and year specific eligibility parameters for child age and family
income thresholds14) The benefits are established from administrative data on average ex-
penditures per adult and child by state and year. Regarding take-up rate, the calculator
14Pregnancy eligibility is also accounted for by the calculator.
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assumes 100% if eligibility arises through AFDC while the take-up rate for eligible children
varies by year as given in other sources.
A.3 SNAP (Food Stamps)
Since we could not find a calculator to determine eligibility to the ”Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program” (SNAP, formerly ”Food Stamps”) and to impute benefits we followed
Hoynes and Luttmer (2011) in constructing our own calculator. Our main reference to
design its elements was Moffitt (2016), the chapter by Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2015) in
particular, as well as the comprehensive summaries and benchmark imputations presented
in Hoynes et al. (2014) and Tremblay (1994). We also consulted Aussenberg (2014), Wilde
(2001) and Hanson and Andrews (2009) to familiarize ourselves with details on the SNAP
definition of net income as presented in section A.3.2 and its interaction with other transfer
programs.
A.3.1 Eligibility
In general, as SNAP is a federal program, the importance of state parameters for eligibility
(and generosity) ia minor. In fact, they mostly result in marginally different definitions of
countable assets in the means test. SNAP regulations define the unit for which eligibility
needs to be established as consisting of all household members ”who purchase and prepare
food together”. In concrete terms, any household has to meet three criteria to be considered
eligible:
1. Gross monthly income has to be below or equal to 130% of the Federal Poverty Level
(FPL).15
2. Net income (income after specified deductions, see section A.3.2) has to be below or
equal to 100% of the FPL.
3. Countable assets may not exceed a certain amount.
Our calculator accounts for 1 and 2 but does not consider 3. This is because we have not
been able to find the asset limits in current nominal US Dollars for the different years and
family sizes as well as a comprehensive definitions of countable assets. As mentioned above,
there are minor differences across states in this respect.
A.3.2 Benefits
Following the information provided in our references, the SNAP benefit formula is given as
SNAP benefit = maximum benefit – benefit reduction rate × net income
15While the term FPL is used frequently, this measure actually refers to the ’Poverty Guidelines’ (PG).
They are published as current US Dollar amounts for varying family sizes each year in the Federal Register
by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Note that different PGs apply for Alaska and
Hawaii which accounts for the higher cost of living in these two states.
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Maximum Benefit We capture maximum benefits by making use of the fact the SNAP
is designed to cover monthly food expenditures of families with different sizes as established
by the Thrifty Food Plan (TFP)16. Hence, to obtain the maximum benefit data for various
family sizes and years, we collected data on the current US Dollar amounts corresponding
to the TFP.17 As this information is not available in a consolidated database for the years
we study, we combined information from several sources for different time periods:
• 1976 to 1995 We use data provided by Castner (2000) (Table B3). Note that current
US Dollar amounts are only available for even years until 1990. For uneven years
before, we use the average value of the preceding and following year.
• 1996 to 2003 We use data information from the ”Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program Quality Control Data”. They are included in the quality control reports pub-
lished by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Food and Consumer Service
(FCS), which is administering SNAP (and already administered the program when it
was called Food Stamp Program).18
• from 2004 We use data from the Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) database. The
data are provided by the USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service.19
As a consistency check, we compare the values from the different sources for years in which
they overlap. We find that between 1990 and 2000, the data from Castner (2000) and
the USDA are identical, while from 2000 to 2005, the USDA and COLA data are the
same. Hence, we have confidence that the maximum benefits are correctly specified in our
calculator.
Net Income Following the official program definitions, we establish SNAP net income as
cash pre-tax income (1)
– standard deduction (2)
– 20% deduction of earned income (3)
– excess shelter cost deduction (4)
– deduction for childcare costs associated with working and training (5)
– medical cost deduction for elderly and disabled (6)
= net income (7)
As our prototype household does not meet the criteria captured in (4), (5) and (6), our
calculator does not consider them. For (2), we could not find the data for different years
16”Benefits are tied to the cost of a market basked of foods which if prepared and consumed at home,
would provide a complete, nutritious diet at minimal cost, the so-called Thrifty Food Plan, (...).” Moffitt
(2016), page 226. The Thrifty Food Plan (TFP) measures the average monthly cost of a healthy meal plan
for different family sizes. It is computed by the US Department of Agriculture and a key policy measure in
setting nutritional cost standards.
17Note that Congress can choose to increase maximum benefits above the TFP level during economic
downturns. For example, this was one element of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.
Our calculator accounts for this temporary policy change.
18Mathematica Policy Research was contracted to produce the reports and datasets. Both are available at
https://host76.mathematica-mpr.com/fns/ See appendix C of the technical documentation for program
parameters such as the maximum benefit, income screen etc.
19See https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/cost-living-adjustment-cola-information
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and family sizes so we omit this deduction. However, the calculator carefully considers
the fact that SNAP regulations define cash pre-tax income listed in (1) to exclude in-kind
benefits and tax credits. In other words, (1) does not include Medicaid, state and federal
earned income as well as child tax credits. It does include include cash transfers. While
disbursements of social security, disability income and unemployment insurance would meet
this criterion, they are not relevant due to the specification of our prototype household.
What matters for our household are AFDC/TANF transfers which our SNAP calculator
adds to cash pre-tax income.
Benefit Reduction Rate While the official SNAP benefit reduction rate is 0.3, Hoynes
and Schanzenbach (2015) argue that the rate which applies in practice is below this statutory
value because of the deductions to net income described above. Another source of variation
of the benefit reduction rate is described in Hanson and Andrews (2009). They show that,
from a household perspective, the SNAP benefit reduction rate is subject to interaction with
other welfare programs such as AFDC/TANF. As the benefits of these programs vary by
state and year, the SNAP benefit reduction rate is likely to vary across states and years as
well. To account for this issue, we simulate our model with two different benefit reduction
rates (0.3 and 0.15). However, our results are robust as the quantitative changes induced by
this variation are minor. This is because eligibility is not affected by the benefit reduction
rate (see section A.3.1) and because those households which receive SNAP benefits have
very low values of net income.
A.3.3 Take-up rates
The USDA publishes annual reports titled ”Estimates of State Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program Participation Rates”. These reports document that participation rates
vary considerably across states and years. It has been pointed out that these differences
are partly associated with asymmetric state business cycle movements and other state and
local policies such as school lunch and emergency food programs. Moreover, participation
rates also depend on the amounts of collectable benefits. As we are interested to study a
household which is comparable across years and states (our prototype family), we do not
account for differences in take up rates in our SNAP calculator. On the one hand, this
is because we aim to measure the maximum amount of transfers available to households
and not those actually collected. On the other hand, we do not want to capture outcomes
which are plausibly linked to specific state (and year) effects to keep our results focused on
comparability.
A.4 Taxes
We use TaxSim to obtain federal and state liabilities for different years and states. TaxSim
provides federal taxes since 1960 and state taxes since 1977. Importantly, it includes state
and federal earned income tax credits and accounts for different state rules on deductibil-
ity of federal taxes as well as child care tax credits. Moreover, it allows to account for
household characteristics such as number of children which are relevant determinants of a
family’s actual total tax burden. We use the income data we obtained from the data (see
above) corresponding to poor and rich families in the different years and states. Moreover,
we account for transfer incomes imputed by our calculators described above, i.e. we make
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sure to use the best estimate for taxable income.
How accurate are our federal and state tax imputations? We first note that TaxSim is the
almost exclusive tool used for this purpose so our imputations are no worse than those of
the vast majority of other contributions. Second, since we cannot observe the tax data we
are interested in (see above discussion), we have to rely on imputation. Hence, the only
benchmark for comparison are alternative tax calculators. To the best of our knowledge,
there are two other candidates: The tax calculator developed and maintained by Bakija
(2017) and the Urban Institute’s Transfer Income Model (TRIM).20 To judge if any of these
alternatives is strictly superior to TaxSim for the purpose of our project, we present below
a succinct summary of Wheaton and Stevens (2016) who conduct a detailed comparison of
all three tax calculators.
Federal Taxes For federal income taxes (table 2A), there are only negligible differences
between the three tax calculators. All three are either equally close to or far from the target
defined by administrative tax data. Differences between them are always in the ballpark
of two to three percentage points.21 This impression is confirmed by the more detailed
comparisons presented in table 2B and applies even more to tax credits (table 2C) where
the three alternatives produce virtually identical results.
State Taxes Regarding state income taxes (tables A4 and 4B) TRIM performs consis-
tently worse than TaxSim and Bakija. While they are close in terms of meeting the target, it
appears that TaxSim is marginally superior. For state earned income tax credits, all three
are lining up closely but TaxSim seems again a marginal winner based on the summary
evaluation presented in the final rows of table 4C.
As Wheaton and Stevens (2016) demonstrate the relative performance of the three tax
calculators also depends on the source of the tax variables. However even for different
inputs (Census or TRIM tax variables), the variation between them remains minor. Since
we are using our own input variables – which are different from the ones used by Wheaton
and Stevens (2016) – we conclude that conditional on our inputs the variation across the
different calculators is likely to be small and that TaxSim is overall the best choice for our
project. Therefore, we think the imputation procedure of federal and state taxes is the best
we can achieve as we have no reason to believe that any of the other tools would give more
accurate results.
A.5 Data inputs
As inputs to our simulation model, we obtain data on households in different years and
states from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS, Ruggles et al. (2017))
USA dataset. It provides cross-sectional variables on households in different states and
years (dating back as early as 1850). Since we only have state taxes since 1977, we choose
1980 as the first year of our analysis. IPUMS assembles information from several sources,
such as the decennial censuses (for years 1980 and 1990) and the American Community
20See here http://trim.urban.org/T3Welcome.php
21The only exception is the alternative minimum tax where TRIM performs better than TaxSim and
Bakija by eight and five percentage points respectively.
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Survey (ACS; annual since 2000). Importantly, variable codes and labels are harmonized
across years and data sources so that they consistently contain the same information.
A.5.1 Household Income
We use total annual family income22 as the income variable of households and classify
households as poor or rich based on the 10% and 90% percentiles of the corresponding
state and year distributions. This measure for income comprises current USD amounts of
annual ”total pre-tax money income earned by one’s family from all sources”. Since this
variable sums the incomes of all family members who are related to the head it excludes
incomes of family members who are not related to the head. To check if this aspect makes
a quantitative difference, we also use a personal income variable23 which ”reports income
earned from wages or a person’s own business or farm for the previous year” and sum it for
all family members (related to the head or not) by using the family relationship variables.
The results are virtually identical.
22IPUMS variable is ”FTOTINC”
23”INCEARN”
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